Blog

China’s Belt and Road Initiative

In October 2018 I was appointed as a Visiting International Researcher in the Energy Department of the Polytechnical University of Turin, Italy (PoliTo).

The project PoliTo is leading, which concerns China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is entitled “BRI Risk Predictor.”

PoliTo’s approach differs substantively in many ways from other analyses of the BRI. Of particular relevance is PoliTo’s focus on the energy component of the BRI. The energy analysis, which is applied to each of the 72 countries participating in the BRI, looks at the total energy picture, including total exports, imports, reserves, as well as renewable initiatives.

The PoliTo BRI project incorporates social, political and financial risk factors as well. Included in this assessment are factors related to terrorism, China’s Private Security Companies, and the risk to Chinese workers and executives around the world.

The product of the PoliTo BRI project is a comprehensive assessment of the risk profile for each of the 72 countries.

How The U.S. Pays For Korean War Remains

After North Korea turned over 55 boxes of what are expected to be the remains of American service members who went missing during the Korean War, a Pentagon spokesman said “it reimburses North Korea for the costs of the recovery but does not pay for the remains themselves.” (“For the U.S., a frustrating history of recovering human remains in North Korea,” Washington Post, July 4, 2018)

The reality is that the U.S. pays North Korea an extraordinary amount for remains in extraordinary ways.

There are two types of payments:  (1) Compensation, also known as “gratitude payments,” for remains turned over unilaterally, such as the recent delivery of 55 boxes.  (2) Up-front payments to pay North Korea in advance for its contributions to excavations undertaken in North Korean by a mixed team of U.S. and North Korean personnel, known as Joint Recovery Operations (JRO).

With regard to the compensation payments, in 1991-2 North Korea turned over 208 boxes of remains.  On August 24, 1993 the United Nations Command (UNC) and the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) signed an “Agreement on Remains-related Matters.” For the first time, the U.S. military agreed to “render support” for the NKPA’s efforts to locate, exhume, repatriate and identify the remains of UNC personnel.

The NKPA interpreted “render support” to mean that the UNC was required to compensate the NKPA for costs incurred for the previous unilateral turnover.  The NKPA demanded $3 million.  Negotiations were on-again off-again until 1996.  After a meeting in New York, acting on behalf of the UNC which objected to the way DoD had handled the negotiations, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Wold agreed to pay the NKPA $2 million.

At the bottom of the New York Agreement was the following handwritten note, “Both sides agreed this compensation will not serve as a precedent for any further compensation.”  The payment was made in Pyongyang on May 20, 1996, apparently in cash.

With regard to the advance payments for the right to conduct JRO’s in North Korea, I obtained the terms of two payments made in 2004 and 2011. These are referred not as agreements, but “Record Of Arrangement.”  The final clause of the 2011 deal states, this Record of Arrangement “is a voluntary arrangement” that “is not intended to be a binding document.”

In 2004, in a “Record of Arrangement” the Department of Defense agreed to provide the following to North Korea to facilitate the JRO’s scheduled for 2005:

  1.  83,136 kg of rice, 10,392 kg of vegetables, 395,055 liters of gasoline, 111,504 liters of diesel, 12,500 liters of kerosene, 12,265 liters of lubricant
  2.  24 new Nissan Patrols and two vans
  3. Replaced 14 Nissan Patrols and two cargo trucks with 24 Mitsubishi Pajeros and two new cargo trucks
  4. Leased 20 sedan, four buses and four truck
  5.  $5,500,000 in cash

In exchange, the North Koreans agreed to provide:

  1. Access to a fax machine
  2. Telephone capable of calling the US
  3. Weekly visits to each field site
  4. Access to continuous communications via telephone and two-way communications with the base camp.

After all of the goods, supplies and cash were delivered, the 2005 JRO’s were cancelled by DoD on May 25, 2005, in the middle of the program. The DPRK retained all of the goods and did not return any of the money.

In the 2011 “Record of Arrangement” DoD agreed to deliver the following to facilitate the 2012 JRO’s:

  1.  30 new sport utility vehicles and two new cargo trucks
  2. Leased 30 sedans, four buses, and four trucks
  3.  72 tons of rice, 8.9 tons of vegetables, 26 tons of meat, 333,204 liters of gasoline, 100,000 liters of diesel fuel, 12,500 liters of kerosene, seven tons of propane, and 8,660 liters of lubricant.
  4.  $5,699,160 in cash

All of these supplies and the cash was delivered to North Korea in February 2012.  On March 28, 2012, DoD canceled the 2012 JRO missions.  North Korea again received the supplies, vehicles and the cash in return for exactly nothing.

The 2004 and 2011 deal provided North Korea with $11,199,160 in cash in exchange for nothing.  There is no doubt that the North Korean junta used this money to buy all kinds supplies.

There is no evidence that anyone at any level, neither the DoD Inspector General (IG) nor any Congressional oversight committee, has ever audited these shipments and payments.  The DoD IG, which extensively audited payments made to Vietnam, has never been instructed to audit the payments to North Korea.

The question now is, how will the Trump administration respond if North Korea demands a “gratitude payment” for the 55 boxes?  Any payment, such a millions in cash as before, would violate U.N. sanctions.

(Note:  Trump made the false statement that “thousands and thousands” of parents of the Korean War missing had asked him to bring home remains from Korea.  Trump made the false statement that North Korea had returned 200 sets of remains.)

New York Times Highlights My RAND Korean War Report

My RAND report, POW/MIA Issues: The Korean War (1994) was quoted extensively in a June 15 NY Times article.  The article is entitled, “Trump-Kim Deal Promises Answers for Families of Korean War M.I.A.s”
Look for the link to the RAND report in the text.  My RAND report was published in 1994.  Here’s the link if you want to jump to it.
The issue concerns the Trump-Kim agreement on the return of the remains of American service members who went missing
during the Korean War.
I circulated a letter to the editor to various newspapers concerning the deal, but no takers.  I’ve attached the letter should you have time/interest.
Let’s hope they notice my new book before 24 years have passed.  The link to this book is here.
The take-away is that we can and should do much better than this.
Here’s the Letter to the Editor:

Dear Editor

The Joint Statement signed by President Trump and Chairman Kim (“Trump and Kim joint statement from the Singapore summit,” WP June 12, 2018) states, “The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”

There is no evidence that the DPRK has ever accurately identified the remains of any American service member missing from the Korean War. Instead, the DPRK has returned degraded bones that are intensely commingled and have been stored for years. For example, in the early 1990’s, the DPRK provided 208 boxes of remains. In one case, the remains consisted of one partial skull and multiple femurs with a plastic wallet-sized calendar from an insurance agency in New York that the DPRK claimed was the individual’s ID card.
 
As documented in my book (POW/MIA Accounting Volume 1: Searching for Americas Missing Servicemen In The Soviet Union, Palgrave May 2018), the 208 boxes of remains (referred to as the K208 collection) have yielded a minimum number of individuals in excess of 450. Due to DNA analysis and the expertise of the Central Identification Laboratory’s scientists have identified more than 50 missing Americans who have been returned to their families.
 
Beginning in 1996, over 30 joint recovery operations were conducted in the DPRK. The DoD gave the DPRK tens of millions of dollars in cash plus dozens of SUV’s, tons of fresh fish, millions of liters of gasoline and other supplies, all without an agreement or receipts.
 
The DPRK should not be allowed to recover remains on their own. The DPRK’s incompetence and deliberate deception known as “salting” recovery sites are a matter of record. The lesson is that the U.S. recovery teams should be allowed to conduct recovery operations independent of DPRK assistance.
 
There are no missing Americans who are “already identified” to be repatriated. This incoherent statement, which only muddles the issue, reflects a near total ignorance of the role of science in the POW/MIA accounting program and bears no relationship to the factual record of how the Korean War missing are recovered and identified.
 

Sincerely,

—————————-
Paul M. Cole, PhD, MSFS

Kim-Trump Joint Statement on POW/MIA Accounting Is Flawed

The Joint Statement signed by President Trump and Chairman Kim (“Trump and Kim joint statement from the Singapore summit,” WP June 12, 2018) states, “The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”

 
There is no evidence that the DPRK has ever accurately identified the remains of any American service member missing from the Korean War. Instead, the DPRK has returned degraded bones that are intensely commingled and have been stored for years. For example, in the early 1990’s, the DPRK provided 208 boxes of remains. In one case, the remains consisted of one partial skull and multiple femurs with a plastic wallet-sized calendar from an insurancee agency in New York that the DPRK claimed was the individual’s ID card.
 
As documented in my book (POW/MIA Accounting Volume 1: Searching for Americas Missing Servicemen In The Soviet Union, Palgrave May 2018), the 208 boxes of remains (referred to as the K208 collection) have yielded a minimum number of individuals in excess of 450. Due to DNA analysis and the expertise of the Central Identification Laboratory’s scientists have identified more than 50 missing Americans who have been returned to their families.
 
Beginning in 1996, over 30 joint recovery operations were conducted in the DPRK. The DoD gave the DPRK tens of millions of dollars in cash plus dozens of SUV’s, tons of fresh fish, millions of liters of gasoline and other supplies, all without an agreement or receipts.
 
The DPRK should not be allowed to recover remains on their own. The DPRK’s incompetence and deliberate deception known as “salting” recovery sites are a matter of record. The lesson is that the U.S. recovery teams should be allowed to conduct recovery operations independent of DPRK assistance.
 
There are no missing Americans who are “already identified” to be repatriated. This incoherent statement, which only muddles the issue, reflects a near total ignorance of the role of science in the POW/MIA accounting program and bears no relationship to the factual record of how the Korean War missing are recovered and identified.

Searching for Missing American Servicemen In The Soviet Union — How To Order

POW/MIA Accounting — Volume 1: Searching for Missing American Servicemen In The Soviet Union (Palgrave-Macmillan) was published on April 15, 2018.

To order, click Online Order Volume 1

For the flyer, click Volume 1 Flyer

You can read the front and back material as well as the summary for each chapter.  The book is available as an e-book or hardback.  Individual chapters are  sold separately as well.

Volume 2, entitled J*P*A*C and The Politics of Human Skeletal Identification ihas been accepted for publication.

Why Dirty (Nuclear) Bombs Don’t Work

Why Dirty (Nuclear) Bombs Don’t Work

And

Nuclear Weapons Are Not Useful (Most of the Time)

 

 

By

Paul M Cole, MSFS, PhD

 

 

March 2, 2018

 

 

 

 


Radioisotope Dispersion Device (RDD)

With regard to Radioisotope Dispersion Devices (RDD’s), aka a “dirty bomb,” there is no consensus on the definition of this type of weaponized radioisotope.   The following are two competing definitions:

  • A radiological dispersal device (RDD) would be designed to disperse radioactive material over a large area.[1]
  • A dirty bomb is designed to spread radioactive material and contaminate a small area.[2]

RDD’s are neither weapons of mass destruction, nor are they nuclear explosive devices.  Despite this fact, RDD’s were mistakenly defined as a “weapon of mass destruction” by the U.S. Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 1997.[3]

NDAA FY1997 not only gave RDD’s unwarranted credibility, the mis-categorization of RDD as a weapon of mass destruction weakened the government’s ability to address RDD’s with appropriate policies and plans.

There are many reasons why an RDD should not be classified as a weapon of mass destruction.

Most relevant is the fact that an RDD, which does not produce a nuclear explosion, is an amalgam of conventional explosives (e.g., TNT) and radioactive material that together cannot create a nuclear explosion. The majority of fatalities or injuries that could be potentially caused by an RDD would result from the conventional explosion itself.[4]

There are significant indications that RDD’s are clumsy, ineffective devices that pose a greater threat to those attempting to assemble one.  Radioisotopes pose a great danger to human beings.  An individual attempting to assemble an RDD who mishandled a Cobalt-60 rod, which would cause a lethal dose of radiation within a minute, would probably die within a couple of weeks.[5]

Several nations have investigated the utility of RDD’s.  “According to a UN report, Iraq tested a one-ton radiological bomb in 1987 but gave up on the idea because the radiation levels it generated were insufficient.”[6]

Israel undertook a four-year dirty bomb project with radioisotopes to determine the effectiveness of a dirty bomb attack and how to defend against one. The conclusion was that such an attack would be ineffective and that RDD’s do not pose a substantial danger beyond the conventional blast and the psychological effect.[7]

While large numbers of people in a densely populated area in the close proximity to the detonation of an RDD might become exposed to radiation and require decontamination, few if any will be contaminated to a level that would necessitate medical treatment.

In 1995 Chechen rebels, who buried dynamite attached to a small amount Cesium137[8] in Moscow’s Ismailovsky park, instructed a TV station where to find it.  The Chechens apparently concluded that the RDD’s value as a weapon of intimidation was greater than any political utility that could be derived from the detonation of the device.  There is no evidence, however, that the discovery of the RDD altered Russia’s policy or conduct in favour of the Chechens.  In fact, the revelation that the Chechens were contemplating the use of an RDD may have had the opposite effect by hardening the Russian attitude against the Chechens responsible for planting the RDD.

Detailed scientific studies of RDD’s of various designs using a range of radioisotopes conducted over many years concluded that RDD’s are ineffective radioisotope dispersion devices. The U.S. Sandia National Laboratory “conducted experiments on the aerosolization of radiological dispersal devices […] for more than twenty years. […]  Over 500 explosive experiments were undertaken with more than 20 [radioactive] materials and 85 device geometries to determine the aerosol physics that are representative of what might occur from the detonation of an actual device.”[9]   One important conclusion from this series of experiments was that it is extremely difficult to disperse radioisotopes in an aerosol form of sufficient intensity to cause mass casualties.

Although the public may associated plutonium and enriched uranium with the word radioactive, these TENORM are not effective RDD materials for several fundamental reasons.  TENORM radioisotopes, which are primarily alpha emitters, are costly, cannot be obtained in large amounts, are well-tracked and secured, and are more useful to terrorists in the production of an actual nuclear weapon than being wasted in an RDD. Attachment of plutonium to the skin or hair poses no hazard since the alpha rays cannot penetrate human skin.[10]  Spent nuclear fuel is also a useless material for dirty bombs, primarily due to the fact that is is a very heavy, dense ceramic, thus nearly impossible to disperse in aerosol form.

Fortunately, “dirty bombs” have another inherently self-regulating feature. The greater the dispersal achieved and the more people affected, the lesser the dose of radiation.  For example, a 25 gram CsCl137 source (about 2,200 Ci) is lethal after about one hour of exposure at one meter.  However, the source is not lethal if spread over the one-billion square feet of surface area in 10 by 10 city blocks, which would the area of a large downtown metropolis covered by a good-sized car bomb.[11]

It appears that RDD’s are ineffective unless created on a massive scale.  The explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was the largest RDD event in history.  The power of the Chernobyl explosion was equivalent to “ten tons (10t) of TNT,”[12] or one percent (0.01) of one kiloton, or ten tons of TNT.

Chernobyl released approximately 27 kilograms of Cs137, which was the equivalent of 200-400 times as much radiation as released by either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs.[13]  The blast contaminated approximately 63,000 square miles (163,169 km2).  A non-state actor does not have the resources to create a RDD event of this magnitude.

There is also evidence that there is little interest among non-state actors to acquire the TENORM required to construct an RDD.

Past experience suggests there has not been a pattern of collecting such sources for the purpose of assembling an RDD. It is important to note that the radioactivity of the combined total of all unrecovered sources over the past 8 years (when corrected for radioactive decay) would not reach the threshold for one high-risk radioactive source.[14]

The task, therefore, is not to abolish the probability of a RDD, which is impossible; rather, the task is to minimize the putative political utility that could be derived by a non-state actor.

The TENORM required to construct an RDD must come from a reactor or a storage facility.  The most critical measure, therefore, is to prevent the illegal introduction of unregulated radioactive material into the hands of those capable of assembling a functioning device.

In the event that prevention fails, the emphasis shifts to mitigation.  The key to mitigating the effects of an RDD explosion is an effective public relations and clean-up strategy.

There is little political utility to be derived by a non-state actor (e.g., a terrorist organization) from the detonation of an RDD.

In contrast to the limited political utility that could be derived from an RDD a great deal of political utility that may be derived by a national government from proper preparation and publicity that will diminish the psychological impact and physical effects of an RDD explosion.

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)

An Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is defined as:[15]

  • An illicit nuclear weapon bought, stolen, or otherwise originating from a nuclear state, or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that produces a nuclear explosion.
  • Built from the components of a stolen weapon or from scratch using nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium).
  • Produces same physical and medical effects as nuclear weapon explosion.
  • Results in catastrophic loss of life, destruction of infrastructure, and contamination of a very large area.
  • If nuclear yield is NOT achieved, the result would likely resemble a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) in which fissile weapons material was dispensed locally.
  • If nuclear yield is achieved, results would resemble a nuclear explosion.
  • Like nuclear explosions, IND explosions may be modeled using a fallout map.

The problems associated with deriving political utility from an IND are almost symmetrical with the problems associated with an RDD.

The technical problems associated with creating an IED are symmetrical with the construction of an RED.  An IED would require 25 to 50 kilograms of HEU or Pu238. However, weapons-grade fuel is not required to build an IND.  Uranium enriched to approximately 20 percent would suffice.[16]

Non-state actors lack the capacity to produce the TENORM required for an IND, thus the only option is to acquire the material from sources controlled by national governments, through theft or some other type of illegal activity.  Obtaining TENORM sufficient for an IND, however, appears to be a difficult task.

“There have been some twenty known cases of theft of plutonium and highly enriched uranium since 1990 and many more of other radioactive materials.”[17]  There have been two decades of illicit trade in radioactive material, yet not one example of an IND.

The task, therefore, is to prevent the transfer of large quantities of TENORM, including that contained in an existing NED.  The regulatory regime required to achieve this objective would be a combination of treating TENORM as a hazardous material with nuclear non-proliferation measures.

Nuclear Explosive Device (NED)

The term “Nuclear Explosive Device” (NED) is defined as “any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).”[18]

All of the empirical evidence points to a similar conclusion, viz., that with a only two exceptions the utility of nuclear weapons as a tool of coercive force or diplomacy has been on the decline since the 1950’s.

  • The first exception was the condition of mutually assured destruction that defined the U.S. – Soviet security relationship during the Cold War.
  • The second exception is the only case where the target of a threat to use nuclear weapons has admitted that the threat altered the target’s behaviour, viz., the PRC during the Sino-Soviet border dispute in the late 1960’s.[19]

Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have lost much, if not all, of their value as a nation-state’s ability to manifest force or coercive diplomacy. A 2012 study conducted by a group of former U.S. national-security officials and political leaders chaired by former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, concluded  emphatically:

No sensible argument has been put forward for using nuclear weapons to solve any of the major 21st century problems we face [including] threats posed by rogue states, failed states, proliferation, regional conflicts, terrorism, cyber warfare, organized crime, drug trafficking, conflict–driven mass migration of refugees, epidemics, or climate change. […] In fact, nuclear weapons have on balance arguably become more a part of the problem than any solution.  (Emphasis added)

In light of this finding, it is not surprising that the number of nuclear weapons has diminished significantly since the end of the Cold War.  Warheads with high yields, including those in the megaton range, have been progressively phased out of U.S. and Russian inventories in favour of smaller weapons.

The fact of the matter is that utility of nuclear weapons as a means to influence or coerce other nations is negligible.

Extraordinary claims required extraordinary proof.

That which is asserted without evidence may be refuted without evidence.

The onus is on those who assert the political utility of radioactive explosive devices (RED) to produce verifiable evidence that demonstrates that nations alter their policies or conduct to accommodate the interests of nations that possess nuclear weapons.

 

 

## END ##

[1] “Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 12, 2014  http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.html

[2] “Dirty Bomb,” Homeland Security News, (Undated) http://www.nationalterroralert.com/dirtybomb/

[3] SEC. 1403. DEFINITIONS. In this title: (1) The term ‘‘weapon of mass destruction’’ means any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of— (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity.

[4] Recall, for example, that of the approximately 129,000 casualties caused by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the majority (perhaps as high as 75%) of casualties were the result of the blast, not radiation exposure.  “Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Subsequent Weapons Testing,” World Nuclear Association, December 2014.  http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Radiation-and-Health/Hiroshima,-Nagasaki,-and-Subsequent-Weapons-Testing/

[5] A single “rod” or “pencil” of Co60 typically contains 10,000 Ci of radioactivity.  One micro Curie (0.000001, or 1μCi) of Cobalt-60 costs approximately US$81.95.

[6] “Dirty Bombs,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2006  http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/dirty-bombs/p9548

[7] “Haartz Exclusive: Israel Tested ‘Dirty-bomb Cleanup’ in the Desert,” Chaim Levinson, June 8, 2015  http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.660067

[8] The size or weight of a container or shipment does not indicate how much radioactivity is in it.  For example, uranium-238 has 0.00015 curies of radioactivity per pound (0.15 millicuries), while cobalt-60 has nearly 518,000 curies per pound.

[9] “Emergency Response Guidance for the First 48 Hours After the Outdoor Detonation of an Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device,” Stephen V Musolino and Frederick T Harper, Healthy Physics Society, 2006, p 377 http://www.pearceglobalpartners.com/uploads/051106_dirtybomb.pdf

[10] Radiation Hormesis, T D Luckey, CRC Press, 1991,  p 116.  https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=FK7EayQN9dYC&dq=define:+MBq+radiation+of+plutonium&source=gbs_navlinks_s

[11] “Israel Experiments With A Weapon of Mass Disruption,” James Conca, Forbes, June 12, 2015  http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/06/12/israel-experiments-with-dirty-bombs-and-radiation/

[12] “Estimation of Explosion Energy Yield at Chernobyl NPP Accident,” Sergey A Pakhomov and Yuri V Dubasov, Pure and Applied Geophysics, December 16, 2009  http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00024-009-0029-9#/page-1

[13] “Radiation released at Hiroshima or Nagasaki,” http://friendsofchernobylcenters.org

[14] “Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 12, 2014  http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.html

[15] “Nuclear Detonation: Weapons, Improvised Nuclear Devices,” U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Radiation Emergency Medical Management, (undated) http://www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm#ind

[16] “The Deadly Arithmetic of Nuclear Proliferation,” John Wohlstetter, The American Spectator, October 1, 2012.  http://spectator.org/articles/34813/deadly-arithmetic-nuclear-proliferation

[17] “Illicit Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking, Smuggling and Security Incidents in the Black Sea Region since the Fall of the Iron Curtain – an Open Source Inventory,” Alex P. Schmid & Charlotte Spencer-Smith, Perspectives on Terrorism, No. 6, 2012  http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-illicit-radiological/html

[18] 22 USCS §6305 (4) Title 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse; Chapter 72. Nuclear Proliferation Prevention; Sanctions for Nuclear Proliferation

[19] “Nuclear Signaling and China’s Perception about Nuclear Threat: How China Handled Nuclear Threats in the Cold War,” Tong Zhao, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech (undated), http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/Nuclear%20Signaling%20and%20China%E2%80%99s%20Perception%20about%20Nuclear%20Threat%20-%20How%20China%20Handled%20Nuclear%20Threats%20in%20the%20Cold%20War.pdf

Speaking Tour to China and Singapore

Delivered four lectures in December 2017:

(1) “Threats and Sanctions,” the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) Security and Crisis Management program conference on the Security and Investment in the Belt and Road Initiative,

(2) “Think Tanks and Great Power Relations,” Shanghai Global Think Tank Forum,

(3) “Foreign Policymaking In Washington, DC,” Shanghai Institute for American Studies,

(4) “Public Policy Research and Foreign Policy,” Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

Attended and ASEAN at 50 seminar in Singapore organized by Hans Vriens Partners as part of the Johns Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies alumni association.

Contract for Volume 2 of POW/MIA Accounting

Palgrave-Macmillan has offered a contract to publish Volume 2 of POW/MIA Accounting, entitled, J*P*A*C: The Politics of Human Skeletal Identification.  The book covers the years 2010-2014 when I was a Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) Fellow assigned to the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command’s (JPAC) Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii.  Volume 2 addresses the influence of paid lobbyists and the role of junk science in the DoD program intended to account for American servicemen who went missing during America’s historic conflicts.  The role of Congress, particularly the lack of effective oversight, is discussed in detail.

Volume 2 is scheduled for release in late-2018.

Searching for Missing American Servicemen In The Soviet Union

Searching for Missing American Servicemen In the Soviet Union is the first of a two-volume book concerning Dr. Cole’s first-hand experience in the POW/MIA accounting program.  Volume 1 is scheduled to be published in hardback and e-edition by the global academic publisher Palgrave/Macmillan in February 2018.  Volume 1 documents a multi-year research effort sponsored by the Department of Defense (DoD) that included work in the KGB archives in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine as well as research in Soviet military archives in Moscow.  Volume 1 includes research in the East German secret police (Stasi) archives.  Volume 1 provides primary source evidence that American servicemen were transferred to the territory of the Soviet bloc.

Volume 2, entitled: J*P*A*C — The Politics of Human Skeletal Identification, is scheduled for publication in mid-2018.  Volume 2 documents the political struggle for control of the science of human skeletal identification in the POW/MIA accounting program.  Meddling by paid lobbyists and weak Congressional oversight resulted in a highly-politicized environment in which forensic science was compromised for political purposes repeatedly.  Manipulation of the media by Federal employees and private citizens referred to by members of Congress as “evil creeps” and “vile scoundrels” is documented as well.